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Taking stock of phenomenology futures

Abstract: I review recent contributions of phenomenology to a variety of disciplines, including
the cognitive sciences and psychiatry, and explore (1) controversies about phenomenological
methods and naturalization; (2) relations between phenomenology and the enactive and extended
mind approaches; and (3) the promise of phenomenology for addressing a number of controversial
philosophical issues.
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I use the plural, ‘futures’, since it seems clear that phenomenology can go, and is going,
in multiple directions. No one of these futures of phenomenology can be the same as
phenomenology’s past. Indeed, as in all prediction, these futures remain a matter of
unfulfilled intuitions and it would involve some intellectual risk to attempt to forecast
how precisely phenomenology as it is practiced today will weather ongoing
controversies. I want to argue, however, that phenomenology remains a good investment,
and should be an essential component in the portfolios of a number of different
disciplines.
One might start to think about the future by looking at past history. To start in this way
requires some caution, and it would be easy to get sidetracked in historical
considerations. Accordingly, I’ll take only a brief look at how things have developed in
recent history, especially with an eye towards future development.
Since the 1960s phenomenology has gone through some very rough times. First, by the
early 60s the founders and main figures were either dead or going in different directions
and there was little reinvestment being made in phenomenology. Second, to continue the
metaphor, there was a general failure at the level of middle managers to produce any
innovative products. How many different ways can one re-package what Husserl,
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre have said, and have said better than any of their
commentators?
Scholarship is essential and important, and there was excellent
scholarship during this time; but scholarship alone doesn’t keep the line going.
Accordingly, during the 1970-80s, markets constricted and phenomenology came to be
considered by some forecasters as close to bankrupt – most clearly by thinkers in the
analytic tradition like Dennett (1991) and Metzinger (1995). As if that weren’t enough
there were several attempts at hostile takeovers by those who wanted to break up or
deconstruct phenomenology, and close down the entire enterprise.
During these times, however, there were a few innovators and entrepreneurs who clearly
set out to build on phenomenological basics. Dreyfus (1973), for example, launched a
highly profitable critique of artificial intelligence based on phenomenological principles

found in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. This work has held up well and still has
currency. It continues to influence thinking about embodied cognition and to spark
ongoing debates on questions related to action and perception (see e.g., Dreyfus 2007;
McDowell 2007; Wheeler 2005).
Another area that saw successful application of phenomenological concepts and that
continues to be current, especially in Europe, involves phenomenological psychiatry.
This approach opposes standard check-list diagnoses which treat psychiatric “symptoms
and signs” from the third-person perspective, as reified, mutually independent and
quantifiable entities, devoid of meaning in themselves, and open to context-independent
definitions and unproblematic objectifications. In contrast, the phenomenological
approach, which builds on the work of Jaspers, emphasizes the importance of the
patient’s experiences; not isolated symptom-referents but details of whole (Gestalt)
experiences, feelings, beliefs, expressions, and actions, permeated by the patient’s
dispositions and by biographical (and not just biological) detail (Gallagher and Parnas, in
press). Actual practice involves second-person interviews guided by phenomenological
distinctions. The more detailed conceptual determinations of the Gestalt proceed through
the steps of psychiatric typifications (Schwartz and Wiggins 1987). Phenomenology has
an important role to play here, and this approach is still under development (see e.g., Sass
and Parnas 2007; Parnas and Zahavi 2002). This includes, for example, ongoing debates
about the status of agency in schizophrenia (e.g., Gallagher 2000) and the development of
recent phenomenological analyses of depression (Ratcliffe 2010).
Thinkers in other fields saw promise in phenomenology as a basis for qualitative research
in various applied areas like nursing and education. In regard to qualitative research,
however, it has often been the case that practitioners with only a passing knowledge of
phenomenology were able to talk about getting to the lived experience of their clients and
patients, but in some important sense were unable to deliver. Much of this work depends
on interviewing subjects about the particularities of their ongoing experience. If
questions are not framed well, however, one frequently gets an opinion or an explanation
of why subjects are feeling a certain way rather than a description of their lived
experience. Another difficulty appears at the point of interpretation by the investigator.
Various methods of organizing the data, or of developing categories that generalize the
individual’s reports are brought over from psychology or the social sciences, but are not
necessarily phenomenological or well integrated with phenomenology. The result is that
the same phenomenological data can be construed in a number of ways and can end up
far removed from the lived experience of the subject (see Gallagher and Francesconi [in
press] for more on this issue and Petitmengin 2006 for a more viable approach).
As indicated, my intention in this paper is not to dwell on the past. As we all know, past
history doesn’t guarantee future performance. But we do see signs here that
phenomenology still has currency in a variety of areas. It may be better to look more
closely at the present, looking forward, to see what possibilities there are for future
development.

Fundamentals and the possibility of outsourcing phenomenological tasks
The transcendental project of phenomenology is certainly alive and well for many
thinkers who concern themselves with explicating the basic structures of consciousness.
A more hermeneutically informed phenomenology tends to point to the limitations
inherent in phenomenological method, and the particularity that one constantly has to
deal with. The transcendental project will still have to defend itself from charges that the
whole project is one that is culturally situated. Is there such thing as consciousness in
general? Or is it rather that since every conscious individual is situated in the world,
every conscious experience will be different in some way? Clearly the task is to identify
those aspects that transcend such particularities and to bracket empirical concerns that
have no place in a transcendental investigation.
Empirical diversity in the lifeworld, however, still might be thought to press against the
transcendental project. Consider as an example recent findings about cultural
differences in solving mathematical problems. Obviously one can choose different
strategies for solving problems, but that’s not the case here. Using simple 3rd-grade
arithmetic problems (e.g., 3+4 = ?) Tang et al. (2006) showed that Chinese speakers
versus English speakers used entirely different brain areas to solve the problems.
“Contrasting to native English speakers, who largely employ a language process that
relies on the left perisylvian cortices for mental calculation such as a simple addition task,
native Chinese speakers, instead, engage a visuo-premotor association network for the
same task” (Tang et al 2006, 10775). This may be accounted for in terms of language
differences as well as differences in learning procedures. If such empirical
considerations do not count against the transcendental project, they surely complicate it.
What’s not clear is whether there are phenomenological differences that correlate to these
different brain processes, although that would be a reasonable assumption to make. If we
do the math and the phenomenology and find out that there are in fact differences at the
experiential level – that is, that solving the simple arithmetical problem the Chinesespeaking way versus the English-speaking way actually feels different or has different
intentional components, then the transcendentalist has to make a decision: should we add
these differences as differences to be accounted for transcendentally, or should we
subtract them as not counting in the more general aspects of the structural features of
consciousness. Given that there are likely many such differences, must the
transcendentalist consider each one on its own merits, or refuse to consider any of them
as relevant to the project? Perhaps a more interesting question is whether the
transcendental problem is like a math problem. Does one’s transcendental strategy
depend on the language one speaks?
More generally, with respect to phenomenological method, one might ask whether
phenomenology can go “high tech” or whether it needs to stick with old-fashioned tools.
Consider the method of eidetic variation and the idea that we can intuit, by “running
through the multiplicity of variations” (Husserl 1973, 346), for example, that which
characterizes all physical objects as physical objects, or even all possible objects as
objects of our experience. This is a large task for any one finite phenomenologist. For
Husserl the process of variation starts with the intuition of an exemplar of the

phenomenon to be investigated, taken as one possible variant among an infinite number
of others. The imaginative variation may be “due to the aimless favor of association and
the whims of the passive imagination” or achieved “by our own pure activity of
imaginative invention from our original model” (Husserl 1973, 343). The process will
allow things to appear as instances of the same phenomenon until we generate a variation
that turns the phenomenon into something else. To see in an essential insight, a
Wesensschau, the structural invariants is to see the essence of the phenomenon and this
happens when we come to establish a horizon within which the object can vary without
losing its identity as a thing of that type (Husserl 1970, 104; Zahavi 2003, p. 39).
If we take on Husserl’s (1913) distinction between formal and material ontology, where
formal ontology is the study of the necessary characteristics of objectivities as such (e.g.
object, relation, property, etc.), and material ontology investigates structures essential to a
particular ontological region (e.g. physical process, living being, mental object, etc.), the
latter may require a supplement to the use of imaginative variation, namely factual
variation.
Just as “[r]eal-life deviations can serve the same function as thought
experiments” (Zahavi 2005, pp. 141) so they may help us to see variations that may not
be so easy to imagine. These may be phenomena that we find manifested in
psychopathology, or in the experimental sciences, for example. Looking at real cases
may not only serve as a starting point to our imaginative variations, it may help us avoid
the presuppositions that phenomenology wants to avoid, since our own imaginative
faculties are limited by various biases or lack of knowledge. Husserl, for example,
claimed that colors and sounds cannot change into each other (1977, 75). At least he
could not imagine how that could be so. But that does not necessarily mean that it is
actually impossible. Indeed, empirical research on synesthesia demonstrates that the
regional (ontological) boundary between colors and sounds can be more malleable than
might be ordinarily expected (e.g., Ward 2008). Eidetic variation concerning how the
lived body might be experienced can certainly be enhanced by considering such
phenomena as Anarchic Hand Syndrome, Somatoparaphrenia, Cotard Delusion, or even
the Rubber Hand Illusion.
Employing factual variation may even be more important when we consider more than
isolated phenomena and try to grasp the complexity of our whole embodied and situated
existence. In such cases, however, even factual variation may not be sufficient. Thus
Froese and Gallagher (2010) suggested a technologically enhanced variation method.
Specifically computer simulation in the field of artificial life offers a method for
investigating possibilities that may lie beyond empirical examples or our finite
imaginations. Artificial life investigates the phenomenon of life using, among other
techniques, computer simulation, especially in evolutionary robotics and the simulation
of artificial agents. This field is concerned with how adaptive behavior emerges out of
non-linear interactions of brain, body and world as a systemic whole (Beer 1997). With
minimal specifications of an agent, its environment and the desired behavior, the system
simulates an evolutionary process that leads to novel and surprising results that often
undermine our preconceptions about the necessary conditions for a certain behavior to
emerge.

What happens in this research does not depend on the imagination of the investigator
since the end result is the product of an evolutionary process that takes the phenomenon
far beyond the minimally controlled starting point and frequently in a way that challenges
the cherished assumptions and expectations of the investigator. As Zahavi puts it, “Our
investigation should be critical and undogmatic, shunning metaphysical and scientific
prejudices. It should be guided by what is actually given, rather than by what we expect
to find given our theoretical commitments” (2003, p. 44). The use of simulating models
avoids the problem of imposing certain pre-established conceptual frameworks and is
quite consistent with what phenomenological methods seek to accomplish. The AI
systems we can imagine, for example, are always limited by our narrow presuppositions,
whether Cartesian in the case of traditional AI (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1988) or
Heideggerian (Wheeler 2005) in the case of the more recent embodied-embedded AI (see
Dreyfus (2007). In addition, in probing philosophical issues that pertain to problem
solving or more holistic forms of life, or “life as it could be” (Langton 1989), the use of
simulations and evolutionary robotics, rather than imaginative variation alone, facilitates
the study of complex systems. Starting with some complex phenomenon and attempting
to vary those features which would turn the phenomenon into something else, as specified
in the eidetic method, may quickly becomes unfeasible in practice given the number of
things one is required to track – something that may not be possible in a unified
intentional act. We can view simulation methods as technological extensions of our
imaginative capacity, providing a crucial link between phenomenology and the
increasingly complex (non-linear, dynamical, self-organizing) phenomena of the
empirical sciences. Froese and Gallagher (2010) suggest “such technology is indeed
necessary for the future development of phenomenology, if it is to live up to its own
ambitions.” Such methods might be considered a form of ‘out-sourcing’ certain tasks of
phenomenology, when such tasks exceed the imaginative capacity of a phenomenological
worker to perform them without the aid of technology.
Corporate re-organization
Perhaps one of the most promising areas of research in phenomenology is the continuing
work on embodiment and embodied cognition.
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological explication of the role of embodiment continues to inspire ongoing
investigations into enactive and extended models of consciousness and cognition. The
development of the enactive approach in the work of Varela, Thompson and Rosch
(1991), initiated an ongoing, phenomenologically-inspired analysis of perception, action,
and intersubjectivity. Enactive phenomenology emphasizes the action-oriented nature of
perception, going back to Husserl’s concept of the ‘I can’, and Heidegger’s analysis of
the Zuhanden and pragmatic understanding of the world. Although there are now several
versions of enactivism, some informed by analytic philosophy of mind and emphasizing
sensory-motor contingencies (Noë 2004) and non-representationalism (Hutto 2006), even
these are consistent with the phenomenological insights of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty
and sometimes explicitly cite these authors.
Ongoing debates about the nature of the body schema as an organization of the lived
body are often allied with this enactive approach (e.g., Gallagher 2005) in opposition to

reductionistic tendencies in the cognitive neurosciences (e.g., Berglotti and Aglioti 2010).
The strong emphasis on embodiment, indeed ‘radical embodiment’ (Thompson and
Varela 2001), also helps to demarcate enactive approaches from more functionalist
approaches in cognitive science. This involves another ongoing debate between
proponents of enactive approaches and those who advocate for the extended mind
hypothesis (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008; Wheeler 2006; Rowlands 2009;
2010). Although there is much that phenomenology can support in the extended mind
idea that our cognitive processes involve incorporating parts of the environment
(perception assisted by the blind man’s cane; memory distributed across biological
system and notebook in hand, etc.), the functionalist tenor of this approach downplays the
importance of the body and overlooks the specifically human characteristics of cognition
that depend on the specifically human body. For the extended mind advocates the
various contributions of the body can be substituted out by either external technologies or
internal representational processes (Clark 2008). This tends to reduce the body to a set of
substitutable mechanisms, undermining the importance placed on the lived body by
phenomenological analysis.
Although the debates between enactive and extended mind theorists are marked by an
important set of differences, there have been a few moves to try to develop some
common ground. Menary’s (2007; 2009) integrative approach, for example, attempts to
maintain the role of the lived body in the characterization of the right kind of coupling
between body and environment necessary for cognition. Gallagher and Miyahara (in
press) argue that insights from the extended mind approach can be supported by an
enactive conception of intentionality (drawing on the notion of operative or motor
intentionality in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty), and that this move would provide a better
defense of the extended mind hypothesis against those who argue for a narrow internalist
definition of mind.
A further area of contemporary research that has benefited greatly from
phenomenological resources concerns intersubjectivity. Much in the same way that more
general considerations about cognition have been reorganized around the notion of
embodiment, recent debates in the area of social cognition, sparked by the development
of cognitive neuroscience, have been pushed towards a reconsideration of the body’s
involvement in our intersubjective interactions. In contrast to the emphasis on
mindreading in the standard “theory of mind” (ToM) approaches in philosophy of mind
and psychology, phenomenologists, citing evidence from both developmental studies of
young infants and phenomenological and behavioral studies of adults, have emphasized
the importance of bodily movements, gestures, facial expressions, eye contact, joint
attention and actions in rich and culturally defined contexts that are both pragmatic and
social (e.g., Gallagher 2001; 2005; Gallagher and Hutto 2006; Ratcliffe 2007). This
approach, which also follows the enactive turn (de Jaegher et al. 2010) has now gained
enough traction that the mainstream ToM proponents who emphasize theoretical
inference based on folk psychology (“theory theory”) or simulational abilities involving
empathy (simulation theory) have started to respond with their own critical perspective
about the role of embodiment (e.g., Goldman and Vignemont 2009), phenomenology
(e.g., Spaulding 2009), or defenses of mindreading and simulation (e.g., Currie 2008;

Gordon 2008; Herschbach 2008; in press).
In regard to phenomenology, for example, Spaulding suggests that “the fallibility of
phenomenology is one reason to doubt [that it can provide guidance on the personal
level]. The total irrelevance of phenomenology is another” (2010, 131). Her point is that,
on ToM interpretations, what is relevant for an explanation of mindreading is entirely on
the subpersonal level.
Without some kind of reference to first- or second-person
experience, however, it’s not clear what the subpersonal explanations are explaining
since intersubjective interactions are not third-person relations that take place between
brains or subpersonal representations, but are rather personal level phenomena.
Specifically, enactive or phenomenological interaction theory suggests that the real action
of social cognition happens in interaction, “out there” in the tango of embodied relations,
rather than in some internal mechanism in the individual mind or brain. This
phenomenological emphasis on embodied interaction shifts the ground, reorganizes the
discussion of social cognition, and redefines the problem in non-Cartesian terms.
New natural products
In regard to the various issues discussed in the previous sections, perhaps the main
question for phenomenologists pertains to the issue of naturalizing phenomenology.
Since the appearance of the 1999 volume Naturalizing Phenomenology (Petitot et al.
1999) this has returned as a disputed question (see Zahavi 2004; 2010). In that volume
various authors argued in favor of naturalizing phenomenology in the sense of putting
phenomenology, as a method, in the service of the natural (cognitive) sciences, either
through a process of mathematization (Roy et al. 1999) or through the integrated method
of neurophenomenology (Lutz and Thompson 2003; Petitmengin et al. 2007; Thompson,
Lutz and Cosmelli 2005; Varela 1996, 1999). The authors in that volume understood that
this went against Husserl’s original definition of phenomenology as non-naturalistic, and
his argument that phenomenological descriptions cannot be captured in mathematical
formulae. In response to the latter, Roy et al. argued that mathematics itself has
developed since the time of Husserl, especially in the form of dynamical systems theory,
so that some phenomenological detail can be formalized in dynamical models.
More generally, in response to Husserl’s resistance to thinking of phenomenology as
contributing to natural science, and to continued insistence by some phenomenologists
that to naturalize phenomenology would be to do something other than phenomenology,
or that even to speak of a naturalized phenomenology is absurd and a contradiction of
“Husserl’s entire conception of phenomenology” (Lawlor 2009, 2) one can cite Husserl
himself: “every analysis or theory of transcendental phenomenology—including . . . the
theory of the transcendental constitution of an objective world—can be developed in the
natural realm, by giving up the transcendental attitude” (1970, p. §57). Specifially, it’s
important to keep in mind that Husserl was not anti-science, even if he was antiscientistic. Indeed, Husserl, not unlike Descartes and Kant before him, wanted to put
science on the right footing, and this was one of the purposes of transcendental
phenomenology.

Beyond Husserl, others in the phenomenological tradition extended
phenomenology to broader application, integrating the natural sciences of consciousness
and behavior into their considerations. Gurwitsch, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, for
example, each pursued what could be generally called phenomenological psychology.
Gurwitsch appealed to Gestalt psychology, animal studies, and developmental
psychology to support the proper phenomenological characterization of various
experiences (2009, 246). Sartre, for example, in his phenomenological examination of
the imagination played off of empirical psychology, referring, for example, to Flach’s
experiments on images associated with presented words, and offering a reinterpretation of
these experiments to work out distinctions between symbols and images (e.g., 2004,
107ff). Merleau-Ponty is well known for his integration of phenomenology, psychology,
and neurology, making extensive use of the experimental literature and case studies in his
Phenomenology of Perception and in lecture courses at the Sorbonne in 1950-52 (under
the title “Human Sciences and Phenomenology”) where he discusses a “convergence” of
phenomenology and psychology, explicating various misunderstandings on both sides of
this relationship (2010, p. 317).
What we see in each of these cases is, to use Merleau-Ponty’s term, a convergence, but
more than a convergence of results where phenomenology and psychology reach the same
conclusions about specific topics. Indeed, in some cases, a critical distance exists between
the view defended by phenomenology and the received view of psychological science.
Rather, on one reading, the convergence pertains to how phenomenology is put to use in
the research fields of psychology and neuroscience. It’s a convergence on a
methodological plane, which in no way signifies a change in the definition of
phenomenology. Nor is it a threat to transcendental phenomenology. The transcendental
project remains as its own phenomenological project. What we find in Husserl’s concept
of a phenomenological psychology, however, and in the work of Gurwitsch, Sartre, and
Merleau-Ponty, is a certain pragmatic use made of phenomenological method.
Accordingly, these theorists have already provided a positive response to the question of
whether phenomenology can be naturalized. On a different reading, the convergence
signals both some adjustment in the definition of phenomenology, and a more significant
change in the definition of naturalism (see, e.g., Gallagher and Varela 2003; Thompson
2008). What one labels ‘natural’ is still a controversial question in philosophy of science
and is made more so by what phenomenology suggests about what Merleau-Ponty had
called “a truth of naturalism” (1963, 201). On either reading, what remains for the future
is to deliver on these positive possibilities.
Prospectus
Here is a prospectus, an outlook in very summary form, a modest forecast.
(1) Phenomenology is not bankrupt, or dead. There are a number of ways in which
phenomenology will continue to contribute to contemporary debates in a variety
of areas.
(2) Phenomenology will continue to play an important role, not only in philosophical
and critical discussions about artificial intelligence and robotics, psychiatry and

psychopathology, and the status of qualitative research, but also in these
respective applications and practices, contributing to advances in human-robotic
interaction (especially with respect to questions about action and interaction
among autonomous agents), clinical diagnosis and treatment of
psychopathologies, as well as providing a method for qualitative research in a
variety of areas.
(3) Phenomenology will continue to be an important player in the ongoing debates
about the nature of mind, agency, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity. Embodied
and enactive accounts will continue to borrow heavily from established
phenomenological concepts, and will push forward to new phenomenological
insights.
(4) Despite this promise, phenomenology will continue to struggle to define itself and
its methods, incorporating new methods, and being incorporated into different
methodological settings, especially in the cognitive sciences.
Some
phenomenologists will continue to argue about the possibility of naturalization;
some will advocate for a change in the way we think of nature; others will simply
work to make phenomenological methods and insights available to the empirical
sciences in both experimental and qualitative research contexts and continue to
work towards mutual enlightenment.
This prospectus is not meant to rule out other developing markets for phenomenology.
Phenomenology, in a naturalized form, or in its enactive formulation, may find new
application in feminist theory, which may require a balancing personal-level analysis in
its ongoing encounter with cognitive science (see Bluhm et al. 2012). Phenomenology
may offer assistance in a new critical theoretical approach to the analysis of institutional
practices taken as instances of extended mind (Gallagher and Crisafi 2010; Gallagher
2011), or in the development of a critical approach to neuroscience (Slaby 2011). Nor
does any of this rule out the continued development of phenomenology along the
philosophical lines originally drawn by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and
other classical phenomenologists (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008).
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